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MAXIMIN PLAY IN TWO-PERSON BIMATRIX
GAMES
VITALY PRUZHANSKY
Abstract. Since the seminal paper of Nash [7] game theoretic
literature has focused mostly on equilibrium and not on maximin
(minimax) strategies. We study the properties of these strategies
in 2-player non-zero-sum strategic games, whose Nash equilibria
are only mixed.
1. Introduction
The interest in this topic was sparkled by an example in Aumann
and Maschler [3], which we reproduce here for convenience. Consider
the following game.
L R
L 1, 0 0, 1
R 0, 3 1, 0
This game has a unique Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies: p∗ =¡
3
4
, 1
4
¢
for player 1 and q∗ =
¡
1
2
, 1
2
¢
for player 2, where the first number
in each bracket is the probability of each player selecting his strategy
L. This equilibrium yields the following expected payoﬀs v∗1 =
1
2
and
v∗2 =
3
4
. The authors argue that ”...if the equilibrium point concept
is at all convincing, it should certainly be convincing here, where the
equilibrium point is unique”. However, further discussion shows that
the same expected payoﬀs v∗1 and v
∗
2 could be guaranteed by having
each player playing his minimax strategy, namely p =
¡
1
2
, 1
2
¢
and q =¡
1
4
, 3
4
¢
. On the other hand, randomizing according to the equilibrium
probabilities p∗ and q∗ does not guarantee these values. If player 1 is
not absolutely sure that his opponent randomizes according to q∗, he
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will never commit himself to p∗. The same argument is valid for player
2, of course. The authors conclude that they do not know what to
prescribe to play in such a situation, as minimax strategies are not in
equilibrium.
This paper shows that the fact that maximin/minimax and equilib-
rium strategies yield the same expected payoﬀ is not a coincidence.
Section 3 characterizes exact conditions when this is the case, as well
as related issues. Our main result - Value Equivalence Lemma - is very
simple, and it is embarrassing that it was not shown before (at least
we were not able to find a reference to anything similar). Section 4
discusses when maximin and equilibrium strategies are the same. For
the sake of expositional clarity, these two sections consider only cases
when completely mixed equilibria are unique. Section 5 presents ex-
tensions of the basic model and Section 6 demonstrates how in this
case maximin strategies can be used as a refinement of mixed Nash
equilibria.
2. Preliminaries
The primary object of this paper are two-person strategic (bimatrix)
games possessing only mixed Nash equilibria, and in particular those
that are completely mixed1. In a generic bimatrix game (A,B) players’
payoﬀs will be given by two square, non-singular matrices of dimensions
n × n: A for player 1 and B for player 2. It will be convenient to
consider these matrices as the sets of row or column vectors, each vector
denoting a corresponding pure strategy of a player. We will index the
rows of a matrix by subscripts and the columns by superscripts; thus,
ai (bi) and aj (bj) denote the i-th column and the j-th row of matrix
A (B) . Sometimes players are also indexed by i and j; no confusion
will result. Mixed strategies of both players will be identified with
probability vectors in Rn, where the k-th coordinate of such a vector
stands for the probability of player’s selecting his k-th pure strategy.
The set of all mixed strategies of a player is denoted by ∆. Whenever
matrix multiplication is involved, correct dimensions are assumed. We
also suppress transpose signs, thus for any two vectors x and y, xy
denotes their inner product. Throughout, without loss of generality,
we will prove only the statements relating to player 1. Those for player
1As a consequence, every pure strategy of every player is rationalizable in the
sense of Bernheim [4]. However, rationalizability alone does not imply the existence
of a completely mixed equilibrium. See example on p. 1012 in [4].
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2 are completely symmetric, with the only diﬀerence that the words
’rows’ and ’columns’ should be interchanged.
A pair of mixed strategies (p∗, q∗) is a Nash equilibrium of (A,B) if
p∗ ∈ argmax
p
pAq∗.
q∗ ∈ argmax
q
p∗Bq.
Nash equilibria are called completely mixed if p∗ puts positive prob-
ability on every strategy of player 1 and q∗ assigns positive probability
to every strategy of player 2. We will say that the game (A,B) is com-
pletely mixed if it admits a completely mixed equilibrium. Let v∗i be
player i’s payoﬀ in a completely mixed equilibrium (p∗, q∗) . The fol-
lowing fact is typical for (p∗, q∗). Given q∗, any two strategies of player
1 yield him the same equilibrium payoﬀ v∗1. Similarly, given p
∗, any two
strategies of player 2 yield him v∗2. Formally
aiq∗ = v∗1,(2.1)
p∗bj = v∗2,
for any i, j = 1, ..., n. It is well-known that a necessary condition for
such an equilibrium to exist is that no pure or mixed strategy of player
1 (2) is dominated by a convex combination of his other strategies.
Observe that due to the non-singularity of payoﬀ matrices, generic
game (A,B) cannot admit two diﬀerent completely mixed equilibria.
A strategy p ∈ ∆ is a maximin2 strategy of player 1, if and only if
(2.2) p ∈ argmax
p
µ
min
j
pAej
¶
,
where ej is the unit column vector in Rn, i.e. its j-th coordinate is one
and the rest are zero. Thus p maximizes the payoﬀ that player 1 can
guarantee regardless of the actions of player 2.
Similarly, q ∈ ∆ is a maximin strategy for player 2 if and only if
(2.3) q ∈ argmax
q
³
min
i
eiBq
´
,
where ei is the unit row vector in Rn. Likewise, such strategy q
maximizes the minimum of expected utility that player 2 can guar-
antee against any strategy of player 1. Since the functions f (p) =
min{pa1, ..., pan} and g (q) = min{b1q, ..., bnq} are continuous in p and
q respectively and the set ∆ is compact, any bimatrix game has a pair
2We use the term maximin for both players. Of course in strictly competitive
games, where one player’s payoﬀs are the negative of the other one’s, maximini-
mizing with negative payoﬀs is equivalent to minimaximizing. Thus, we are in line
with the terminology of Aumann and Maschler [3].
4 VITALY PRUZHANSKY
of maximin strategies. It is not hard to show that maximin strategies of
each player are not dominated and, thus, rationalizable, provided the
game (A,B) is completely mixed. Hereafter, vi denotes the expected
payoﬀ that player i can guarantee by playing a maximin strategy. Ob-
viously, for any player i, vi ≤ v∗i must hold.
There is a special type of strategies that will play a very important
role in the subsequent analysis. These are the strategies that guarantee
a player the same payoﬀ, regardless of the pure strategy used by the
opponent. For this reason, such strategies will be called column or row
equalizers. Formally, a strategy p ∈ ∆ is a column equalizer for player
1 if it enjoys
(2.4) paj = u, for any j = 1, ..., n,
and some u ∈ R. Similarly, a vector q ∈ ∆ is a row equalizer for player
2 if
(2.5) biq = w, for any i = 1, ..., n,
and some w ∈ R.
Necessary conditions for the existence of equalizer strategies are simi-
lar to the ones for the existence of completely mixed equilibria. Namely,
it is required that no convex combination of columns (rows) of A (B)
dominate convex combinations of other columns (rows). However, in
the case of equalizers one can state both suﬃcient and necessary con-
ditions in one formula. Define matrices eA, eB, row vector eu and column
vector ew as follows
eA =


a11 · · · a1n 1
...
...
...
an1 · · · ann 1

 , eB =


b11 · · · b1n
...
...
bn1 · · · bnn
1 · · · 1


eu = (u, ..., u, 1) , ew = (w, ..., w, 1) .
Then player 1 (2) possesses an equalizer strategy if and only if there
exist a non-negative solution p0 (q0) to the following systems
p eA = eu and eBq = ew.
Similarly to the uniqueness of completely mixed equilibrium strategies
p∗ and q∗ in generic games, the uniqueness of equalizer strategies (once
they exist) follows from non-degeneracy of the payoﬀ matrices.
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3. Main Results
We start out by characterizing conditions, under which the equalizer
strategies are maximin.
Lemma 1. Let a completely mixed game (A,B) possess a column (row)
equalizer p (q) . Then such strategy p (q) is the unique maximin strategy
of player 1 (2).
Proof. We need to show that
(3.1) min
j
pAej > min
j
xAej,
for any x ∈ ∆, x 6= p. Take such an x ∈ ∆, and let y ∈ Rn satisfy
x = p+ y. Note that
nP
i=1
yi = 0. Then
min
j
xAej = min
j
(pA+ yA) ej.
Since p is an equalizer strategy all coordinates of the vector pA are
equal. Further, y 6= 0 by construction, and det (A) 6= 0 by assumption.
Thus inequality (3.1) holds true whenever the vector yA has at least
one negative coordinate. This is indeed so, because (A,B) is completely
mixed and thus there exists q∗ ∈ ∆ such that each coordinate of the
vector Aq∗ is equal to v∗1. Thus
yAq∗ =
Ã mX
i=1
yi
!
v∗1 = 0.
Hence, yA and q∗ are orthogonal. Since q∗ is completely mixed and
lies in the positive orthant Rn+, at least one coordinate of yA must be
negative. ¤
Following the result of this Lemma, we will use the words ’equalizer’
and ’maximin’ interchangeably whenever an equalizer strategy exists in
a completely mixed game. Consequently, in this case equalizer strate-
gies will be denoted by p and q. Also note that the above proof hinges
on the fact that a completely mixed equilibrium (p∗, q∗) exists. This
condition cannot be relaxed. One can easily construct examples of
games with a dominating strategy, which will also be a maximin strat-
egy for a particular player. Even if an equalizer strategy exists in such
a game it will typically be diﬀerent from the maximin one.
The next Lemma shows that each player can guarantee himself the
expected equilibrium payoﬀ by playing the equalizer strategy in a com-
pletely mixed game.
6 VITALY PRUZHANSKY
Lemma 2. Let (p∗, q∗) be a completely mixed equilibrium of (A,B)
with payoﬀs v∗1 and v
∗
2. If there exists a column (row) equalizer p (q)
for player 1 (2), then such equalizer strategy guarantees the equilibrium
payoﬀ against any strategy of the opponent, i.e.
pAq = v∗1
pBq = v∗2,
for all p, q ∈ ∆.
Proof. Let the equalizer strategy p yield v1 to player 1. Then
v1 = pAq = pAq∗,
because, by definition, an equalizer strategy pmakes player 1 indiﬀerent
between any strategy of the opponent. On the other hand, for all p ∈ ∆
v∗1 = pAq
∗ = pAq∗,
as, given q∗, player 1 is indiﬀerent between any of his strategies. Hence,
the desired equality v1 = v∗1 follows. ¤
The following Lemma states that if in a completely mixed game
player’s maximin strategy is not an equalizer, the guaranteed value vi
is strictly smaller than the expected equilibrium value v∗i .
Lemma 3. Let (A,B) be a completely mixed bimatrix game, such that p
and q are not equalizers. Then the following is true: v1 < v∗1 (v2 < v
∗
2) .
Proof. Let p be a maximin strategy of player 1. Because p is not an
equalizer, for some j it will be the case that paj > v1. Let us arrange
the columns of A in such a way that for the first k < n of them paj = v
holds, and for the other n− k ones paj > v1 holds. Therefore, pA = u,
where
u = (v1, ..., v1| {z }
k times
, uk+1, ..., un)
with
uj > v1 for all j = k + 1, ..., n.
In any completely mixed equilibrium (p∗, q∗) it holds that
v∗1 = pAq
∗ for all p ∈ ∆,
and thus
v∗1 = pAq
∗ = uq∗ = v1
Ã
kP
j=1
q∗j
!
+
nP
j=k+1
q∗juj.
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Using the fact that
nP
j=1
q∗j = 1 and q
∗
j ≥ 0 for all j = 1, ..., n,
it follows that v∗1 > v1. ¤
With this background we can state the main result of this Section.
Lemma 4 (Value Equivalence). In a completely mixed bimatrix game
(A,B) player 1 (2) can guarantee the expected payoﬀ from a completely
mixed equilibrium v∗1 (v
∗
2) by playing a maximin strategy p (q) if and
only if such strategy is an equalizer.
Proof. Necessity follows from Lemma 3 and suﬃciency follows from
Lemma 2. ¤
The equality between the player’s equilibrium and guaranteed values
also has an appealing geometric interpretation. If q∗ is a strategy of
player 2 in a completely mixed equilibrium, then by definition aiq∗ =
v∗1, for any i = 1, ..., n. Geometrically it means that all pure strategies
of player 1, viewed as n points in Rn, belong to the same hyperplane
h = {x|xq∗ = v∗1}. On the other hand, for all p ∈ ∆
pA ∈ conv{a1, ..., an},
where conv{a1, ..., an} denotes the convex hull of rows of A, viewed
as points in Rn. Clearly, for any x ∈ conv{a1, ..., an} it is also true
that x ∈ h. As the equalizer p makes player 1 indiﬀerent among any of
strategies of player 2, the vector pA has all its coordinates equal to v1.
Moreover, it satisfies the equation of the hyperplane h
pAq∗ = v∗1.
Since q∗ ∈ ∆, it follows that
v1 = v∗1.
Hence, player 1 can guarantee the equilibrium payoﬀ from a completely
mixed equilibrium (p∗, q∗) if and only if the diagonal ray in Rn (the
locus of vectors with all coordinates equal) belongs to the convex cone3
spanned by the rows of A.
What if the game (A,B) has other mixed strategy equilibria, that are
not completely mixed? Specifically, let (ep, eq) be a mixed Nash equilib-
rium that assigns zero probability to some rows or columns of (A,B) .
The argument of the Value Equivalence Lemma still applies with full
force to a completely mixed ’reduced’ matrix game
³ eA, eB´ consisting
3Recall that cone{a1, ..., an} = {a ∈ Rn| a = λ1a1 + ...+ λnan, λ1, ..., λn ≥ 0}.
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only of those rows and columns, to which (ep, eq) assigns positive prob-
ability4. Thus, once a player possesses an equalizer strategy, which is
also maximin in
³ eA, eB´, it must guarantee him the same payoﬀ as he
receives in the equilibrium (ep, eq) .
We will now formalize the conditions under which the equalizer and
maximin strategies, in contrast to p∗ and q∗, are not completely mixed.
Lemma 5. Suppose that there exists a row i (column j), such that aij =
α (bij = β) for all i, j = 1, ..., n, i.e. row i (column j) oﬀers player 1
(2) the same payoﬀ regardless the strategy of player 2 (1). Then p = ei
(q = ej) is an equalizer strategy of player 1 (2). If, moreover, the game
(A,B) is completely mixed, then p = ei (q = ej) is also a maximin
strategy of player 1 (2).
Proof. The statement that p = ei is an equalizer is self-evident. The
other statement follows from Lemma 1. ¤
If the game (A,B) is not completely mixed, players may have many
equalizers, not all of them being maximin. Also observe that if there
are multiple rows of A such that aij = αi and akj = αk for all j =
1, ..., n, then any convex combination of the pure strategies ei and ek
is a maximin strategy on itself, provided (A,B) possesses a completely
mixed equilibrium, of course. (The same logic holds for player 2).
Maximin strategy of player 1 (2) will be pure if one of the hyperplanes
in the set {pa1, ..., pan} ({b1q, ..., bnq}) lies below5 all others. Formally,
there exists k, l = 1, ..., n such that
pal ≤ paj,(3.2)
bkq ≤ biq,
for all i, j = 1, ..., n and all p, q ∈ ∆. These conditions imply that
the l-th column (k-th row) of matrix A (B) is dominated by all other
columns (rows). Thus, if player 1 (2) were to minimize the payoﬀ of
player 2 (1), then he would choose his k-th (l-th) strategy. Clearly,
then a pure best response to the l-th (k-th) strategy of the opponent
will be a maximin strategy of player 1 (2). Note that if at least one of
the inequalities in (3.2) is strict for all possible p, q ∈ ∆, such maximin
strategies will not be equalizers.
Pure maximin strategies possess the following interesting property
in 2× 2 (completely mixed) games. Define the function δ : Rn → R as
δ (x) = max (x)−min (x) ,
4Note that the reduced game may not be generic in the sense of Section 2.
5Of course, the region we have to look at is restricted to ∆.
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where max (x) and min (x) are, respectively, the values of maximal and
minimal coordinates of the vector x ∈ Rn. Then the following is easily
checked.
Lemma 6. Let (A,B) be a 2× 2 completely mixed bimatrix game with
maximin strategies p = ek and q = el. Then δ (ak) ≤ δ (ai) and δ
¡
bl
¢
≤
δ (bj) for i, j = 1, 2.
Proof. Omitted. ¤
These p = ek and q = el do not have to be equalizers for the result
to hold. If they are equalizers, however, then δ (ak) = δ
¡
bl
¢
= 0. The
Lemma also requires that (A,B) be completely mixed (cf. Prisoners
Dilemma).
Unfortunately Lemma 6 cannot be generalized for games of higher
dimensions (even if they are completely mixed), as Example 1 shows.
Example 1. Let (A,B) be a bimatrix game, in which the payoﬀs of
player 1 are given by
A =


5.5 2 1
4 3 0
9 0 0


The fact that (A,B) is completely mixed (for a suitably defined matrix
B) can be verified by computing q∗ =
¡
6
17
, 10
17
, 1
17
¢
and v∗1 =
54
17
.Moreover,
p = e1 and v1 = 1. However, δ (a1) = 4.5 and δ (a2) = 4.
The last Lemma in this Section provides a useful insight into the
nature of equilibrium payoﬀs in games possessing several mixed Nash
equilibria with diﬀerent supports.
Lemma 7. Let the game (A,B) possess a completely mixed equilib-
rium (p∗, q∗) and another equilibrium (ep, eq) , which is not completely
mixed. Suppose player i’s payoﬀs in these two equilibria are v∗i and evi,
respectively. If player i possesses an equalizer strategy in (A,B), then
v∗i ≤ evi.
Proof. Without loss of generality let us suppose that the equilibrium
strategy eq assigns positive probability to the first k < n pure strategies
of player 2. The following two relations follow from the self-evident
properties of maximin strategies
max
p
µ
min
j=1,...,n
pAej
¶
≤ v∗1,
max
p
µ
min
j=1,...,k
pAej
¶
≤ ev1.
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Moreover,
max
p
µ
min
j=1,...,n
pAej
¶
≤ max
p
µ
min
j=1,...,k
pAej
¶
.
If player 1 possesses an equalizer strategy in G (A,B), then by Lemma
2
v∗1 = maxp
µ
min
j=1,...,n
pAej
¶
.
Hence,
v∗1 ≤ ev1.
¤
Observe that this result does not depend on the existence of an
equalizer for player i in the ’reduced’ game
³ eA, eB´, that is produced
by deleting from (A,B) those rows and columns, to which (ep, eq) assigns
probability zero. In particular, note that (ep, eq) may be a pure strategy
Nash equilibrium.
Obviously, Lemma 7 can be easily generalized for a sequence of mixed
Nash equilibria {(p∗k, q∗k)}Kk=1, such that supp (p∗k, q∗k) ⊂ supp
¡
p∗k+1, q
∗
k+1
¢
for all k = 1, ..., K, where supp (p∗k, q
∗
k) denotes the set of pure strate-
gies {a1, ..., ak} × {b1, ..., bk} to which the equilibrium (p∗k, q∗k) assigns
positive probabilities. One only needs the requirement that all reduced
games, whose equilibria are indexed by k = 2, ...,K, possess equalizers.
Combining Value Equivalence Lemma with Lemma 7 yields the fol-
lowing: if the maximin strategy of player i guarantees him expected
equilibrium payoﬀ v∗i , then v
∗
i must be the lowest equilibrium payoﬀ to
player i the game.
4. Equivalence Between Equilibrium and Maximin
Strategies
We now turn to a related issue: when is an equilibrium strategy of a
player equivalent to his maximin strategy? In the simplest setting, this
case includes dominance solvable games, eg. Prisoners’ Dilemma. On
a more general level, such games can have several pure strategy equi-
libria. These games are interesting because they give rise to provok-
ing questions about the inability of pre-play communication to select
among pure Nash equilibria6 (see Aumann [2]) or uncertainty aversion
(see Marinacci [6]). Another peculiarity is related to the fact that the
6It can be easily shown that in 2 × 2 games the statement of player i "player
j prefers me to play the strategy x no matter what", that is crucial to Aumann’s
conclusion, implies that player j has a pure maximin strategy.
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payoﬀs in correlated equilibria for the games in this class can lie outside
the convex hull of their Nash equilibria payoﬀs (see Aumann [1] for an
example).
In this Section, however, we will be interested in the equivalence
between completely mixed Nash equilibrium and maximin strategies
that are equalizers. It will be shown that this question can be answered
algebraically, without even computing the strategies themselves. As
before, we restrict attention to player 1. Observe that p defines a
hyperplane h = {x|xp = v∗1}, to which it is orthogonal7, and p∗ is
a normal to another hyperplane h∗ = {y|yp∗ = v∗2}. The question
of equality between equalizer and mixed strategies simply reduces to
characterizing the conditions when h and h∗ are parallel, or, as a special
case of parallelism, coincide everywhere.
Let us first see when h and h∗ do not intersect. Observe that any
point x ∈ h can be expressed as a linear combination of n vectors aj,
j = 1, ..., n, that themselves belong to h
x =
nX
j=1
λjaj, where
nX
j=1
λj = 1.
Similarly, any point y ∈ h∗ can be expressed as
y =
nX
j=1
µjb
j, where
nX
j=1
µj = 1.
Clearly, then h and h∗ have no point in common if and only if the
following linear system has no solution
(4.1)



Aλ = Bµ
nP
j=1
λj=
nP
j=1
µj=1.
If, however, (4.1) holds for any λ and µ satisfying the above constraint,
then h and h∗ completely coincide. We summarize this result in the
following Proposition.
Proposition 1. Let (A,B) be a completely mixed bimatrix game. Then
there exists a probability vector p ∈ ∆ for player 1 that is both his
equalizer (maximin) and mixed equilibrium strategy if the system (4.1)
7Strictly speaking, it must be h = {x|xp = v1}, but here Lemma 2 applies and,
thus, v∗1 = v1.
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either has no solutions, or holds for any λ, µ ∈ Rn that satisfy
nP
j=1
λj =
nP
j=1
µj = 1.
It is an easy exercise to show that for player 2 the corresponding
system is 


λA = µB
nP
i=1
λi=
nP
i=1
µi=1.
5. Extensions
So far we presented all results for the case when payoﬀ matrices
were square and non-singular. The main reason for doing so was to
ensure the existence and uniqueness of completely mixed equilibria8.
In this Section we extend the previous results to the case of arbitrary
m× n payoﬀ matrices. Once we allow for this extension and preserve
existence, we have to face the problem of non-uniqueness of Nash equi-
librium strategies or equalizers. One rationale for considering these,
somewhat degenerate games, is that an interesting refinement of mixed
Nash equilibria arises precisely in this case. The next Section is devoted
to this issue.
Some of the previous results (Lemma 1) slightly change. For in-
stance, it may generically occur that the player with the highest number
of strategies has multiple equalizers, all of which are also maximin (see
Example 2 below). Lemmas 2 through 5 and 7 are not aﬀected by the
extension. An immediate Corollary of Lemma 2, which we formulate
only for player 1 is the following.
Corollary 1. Let (p∗, q∗) and (ep, eq) be two distinct completely mixed
Nash equilibria of (A,B) , yielding payoﬀs v∗1 and ev1 to player 1. If
player 1 possesses an equalizer strategy p, then v∗1 = ev1.
Observe that for the Corollary to hold it is not essential whether
m < n or vice versa .
Lemma 6 can be generalized for those non-generic games, in which
at least one player has only two pure strategies. Specifically, suppose
that payoﬀ matrices have dimensions n× 2 (2×n), and, in addition to
that, the game (A,B) does not have a unique Nash equilibrium in pure
8Generically in this case payoﬀ matrices must be square and non-singular. I am
thankful to G. van der Laan for drawing my attention to this point.
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strategies9. It is possible to show that under these assumptions the
maximin strategy of player 1 (2), say p = ek
¡
q = el
¢
, minimizes the
payoﬀ dispersion of those pure strategies i (j), which are not (weakly)
dominated by p (q). Thus, δ (ak) ≤ δ (ai) or δ
¡
bl
¢
≤ δ (bj) . Again, the
result does not depend on whether the maximin strategies are equalizers
or not.
The question of equality between equilibrium and maximin (equal-
izer) strategies naturally becomes more complicated when such strate-
gies are not unique. The reason is that we need to consider equality not
between a pair of strategies but between two sets of strategies. Denote
the set of equalizers of player 1 by P and the set of his equilibrium
mixed strategies by P ∗. Using the logic of the previous Section, we see
that every p ∈ P defines a hyperplane h, and every p∗ ∈ P ∗ is a nor-
mal to another hyperplane h∗. Let us denote the sets of two types of
these hyperplanes in Rm by H and H∗, respectively. Therefore, every
h ∈ H contains n vectors that are the columns of A, and every h ∈ H∗
contains n vectors, that are the columns of B.
The sets P and P ∗ are identically equal to each other whenever the
following two conditions hold:
i) for every p ∈ P there exists h∗ ∈ H∗, such that p is a normal
to h∗.
ii) for every p∗ ∈ P ∗ there exists h ∈ H, such that p∗ is a normal
to h.
If there is a continuum of either p or p∗, or both, then the question of
equivalence between P and P ∗ is far from trivial: their intersection may
be another set, or a particular vector, or empty. It may be much simpler
to compute the sets of these strategies directly and see if they are
equal, than to answer this question analytically. There are, however,
two special cases, to which we would like to attract attention. The
first one arises if B = cA, where c is a constant10. The second - when
B = A + Z, where all columns of Z are equal, i.e. zj = zk for all
j, k = 1, ..., n. The reader can easily verify that in these two instances
every p that solves (2.4) also satisfies (2.1), and vice versa, provided, of
course, that the game (A,B) is completely mixed. Because of linearity,
for any combination of the above two cases it also holds that the sets
P and P ∗ are identically equal.
The equivalence between equilibrium and equalizer strategies in non-
generic games turns out to play an interesting role for exchangeability
of Nash equilibria. Recall that two equilibria (p0, q0) and (p00, q00) are
9This requirement substitutes the condition that (A,B) be completely mixed.
10Note that strictly competitive games fall in this category with c = −1.
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said to be exchangeable if the pairs (p0, q00) and (p00, q0) are also equi-
libria. It is known from Chin et al. [5] that exchangeable equilibria
exist if and only if the set of all Nash equilibria of a game is convex.
When equilibrium strategies are also equalizers we have the following
strengthening of this result:
Proposition 2. Let (A,B) possess two distinct (not necessarily com-
pletely mixed) equilibria (p0, q0) and (p00, q00) , and let players’ expected
payoﬀs in these equilibria be v0i and v
00
i respectively for i = 1, 2. If the
strategies p0, p00, q0, q00 are also equalizers, then the following statements
are true:
i) v0i = v
00
i for i = 1, 2; and all equilibria are exchangeable.
ii) for any α, β ∈ [0, 1] the pair (αp0 + (1− α)p00, βq0 + (1− β)q00)
is an equilibrium too.
Proof. To prove (i) we have
p0Aq0 = p0Aq00 ≤ p00Aq00
p00Aq00 = p00Aq0 ≤ p0Aq0,
where equalities follow because p0 and p00 are equalizers, and the in-
equalities reflect the fact that p0 and p00 are best replies to q0 and q00
respectively. Hence, p0Aq0 = p00Aq00, i.e. v01 = v
00
1 . Moreover, for player
1 it holds that
p00Aq0 = p0Aq0 ≥ pAq0
p0Aq00 = p00Aq00 ≥ pAq00
for all p ∈ ∆. That is, p00 is a best reply to q0 and p0 is a best reply to
q00. Similar statements can be obtained for player 2. Thus, the pairs
(p0, q00) and (p00, q0) are Nash equilibria too.
To prove (ii), note that for all α, β ∈ [0, 1]
β [αp0Aq0 + (1− α) p00Aq0] ≥ β[pAq0]
and
(1− β) [αp0Aq00 + (1− α) p00Aq00] ≥ (1− β) [pAq00] .
It is then a simple algebra to show that
(αp0 + (1− α)p00)A (βq0 + (1− β)q00) ≥ pA (βq0 + (1− β)q00) .
for any p ∈ ∆. ¤
One special class of games where Proposition 2 applies is the case of
zero-sum games, where it is well known that mixed equilibrium strate-
gies are also equalizers.
Proposition 1 of the previous Section can also be applied in the non-
generic case, however, the interpretation will be somewhat diﬀerent.
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The fact that among the sets H and H∗ there exist two hyperplanes
h and h∗ that do not intersect (or coincide) will imply that the inter-
section of P and P ∗ is non-empty. That is, there exists at least one
strategy, which is both an equilibrium strategy and an equalizer. More-
over, the above proposition will describe the necessary conditions only.
The fact that they are not suﬃcient will be seen from the extension
of Example 2 in the next Section. The intuition for this reasoning is
that if all possible h and h∗ intersect, then clearly their normals cannot
be the same. However, if some hyperplanes do not intersect, then one
more requirement arises that is not stated by (4.1), namely that their
normals belong to the unit simplex. Sometimes this requirement is not
satisfied.
6. Maximin Strategies as a Refinement of Mixed Nash
Equilibria
Just on its own, the existence of an equalizer strategy for player i
strengthens his position in the following two aspects. First, as fol-
lows from Corollary 1, i’s expected equilibrium payoﬀ does not depend
on the particular mixed equilibrium strategy chosen by the opponent,
even if the latter possesses infinitely many such strategies. Second,
as follows from the Value Equivalence Lemma, player i can guarantee
himself the expected equilibrium payoﬀ, should he use the equalizer
strategy. These properties become especially attractive when equal-
izer and equilibrium strategies coincide. In generic bimatrix games
this coincidence is rare because both equalizer and equilibrium strate-
gies are unique. However, in games with a continuum of both types
of strategies matters become more interesting. In these cases equalizer
strategies can be considered as a refinement tool that strengthens those
mixed equilibria that guarantee the expected equilibrium value to the
player and rules out those that do not do so. The following simple
example demonstrates this idea.
Example 2. Let us be given the following game
L M R
T 4, 1 0, 3 2, 1
B 1, 2 3, 1
2
3
2
, 2
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It is possible to show that all (mixed) Nash equilibria (p∗, q∗) are
given by the following pair of strategies
p∗ =
µ
3
7
,
4
7
¶
,
q∗ =
µ
x,
5
7
x+
1
7
,
6
7
− 12
7
x
¶
for any x ∈
·
0,
1
2
¸
,
and yield the following expected payoﬀs
v∗1 =
12
7
+
4
7
x,
v∗2 =
11
7
.
Column a3 of matrix A is dominated by a convex combination λa1 +
(1− λ) a2 for any λ ∈
¡
1
2
, 3
4
¢
, thus player 1 does not have an equalizer
strategy. His unique maximin strategy p turns out to be equal to p∗.
However, it guarantees him just v1 = 127 , which is strictly less than in
any completely mixed equilibrium.
Player 2 has an equalizer strategy q =
¡
y, 2
7
, 5
7
− y
¢
for any y ∈
£
0, 5
7
¤
.
There is a unique point eq = ¡ 7
35
, 10
35
, 18
35
¢
, such that q∗ = q = eq. This eq is
found as the intersection between the sets of q and q∗ on the unit sim-
plex in R3. On the picture below the set of Nash equilibrium strategies
of player 2 is shown by a solid line, and the set of his equalizers by a
broken one.
( )
7
5,
7
2,0
( )0,21,21( )0,72,75
( )76,71,0
( )
35
18,
35
10,
35
7
( )0,1,0( )0,0,1
( )1,0,0
At the intersection point eq, x = 1
5
. If the strategy eq seems to be the most
desirable strategy for player 2, then the most likely expected payoﬀ for
player 1 is v∗1 =
12
7
+ 4
7
· 1
5
= 64
35
.
We now amend the above example to demonstrate the claim of Sec-
tion 5 that Proposition 1 represents only necessary but not suﬃcient
condition for a player to have a strategy that is both maximin and
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equilibrium. Let us suppose that player 1’s payoﬀ matrix now is
A =
µ
4 0 5
1 3 0
¶
,
and leave matrix B without changes. It can be verified that the system


λA = µB
2P
i
λi =
2P
i
µi = 1
does not have a solution, and it can be mistakenly concluded that there
is a q ∈ ∆ such that q = q∗ = q. Indeed, there exists eq = q∗ = q, but it
is not a part of the unit simplex in R3, as the following straightforward
computations show
q∗ =
µ
x,
5
8
− 1
4
x,
3
8
− 3
4
x
¶
for x ∈
·
0,
1
2
¸
,
q =
µ
y,
1
3
,
2
3
− y
¶
for y ∈
·
0,
2
3
¸
,
eq = µ7
6
,
1
3
,
−1
2
¶
.
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